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OCCASIONAL THOUGHTS

ON THE PRESENT

GERMAN WAR.

By the Author of CONSIDERATIONS on the ſame SUBJECT.

The SECOND EDITION.

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THE Author had intended laſt year to have publiſhed a ſecond part of the Conſiderations on the preſent German war. But after having been diſappointed in the hope of remaining concealed, he laid aſide all thoughts of meddling any farther with the ſubject. He now hopes, however, that at a time, when we ſee every day ſo much repeated on one ſide of this queſtion, he may, without being judged preſumptuous, be allowed to ſtate his thoughts on the other. They, who by their ſtation underſtand the ſubject better, have too little leiſure to write, and either too great an intereſt, or too little courage to ſpeak. The reader will excuſe the Author for having thrown together his materials in detached parts, as the few days which have paſt ſince he reſolved on publiſhing, would not admit of his digeſting them into a continued diſcourſe.

He takes this opportunity to declare, that he has not been concerned in any part of the diſputes about the merit or demerit of the late

late Miniſter, nor in any other of the writings (though many of them would have done him honour) which have appeared in the public papers; except only one; which having been badly copied, is here reprinted. His ſubject is the German War: and therein he deſires to confine himſelf to the argument.

A
POSTSCRIPT,
TO THE
CONSIDERATIONS on the preſent
GERMAN WAR.

Writ immediately after the Firſt Day of the laſt Seſſion, and intended for the Second Edition.

AS the leſſening of the chief nurſeries of our enemy's ſeamen, and dividing with them their foreign ſugar trade, ſeems to the Author the great object of the preſent war, he hopes that he may be allowed to obviate any objections which may happen to ariſe.

Should it therefore be ſaid, *that a nation may overconquer itſelf: and by being fed with more conqueſts than it can digeſt, may have the overplus turn to ſurfeit and diſeaſe inſtead of nouriſhment.* To this it may be anſwered:

A ſmall ſtate, ſuch as was that of Venice, for inſtance, by extending its frontiers among a number of adverſe powers, may lay itſelf under a neceſſity

ceſſity of keeping up a greater ſtanding army than it can either ſupport, or retain in due ſubjection; and in that manner may over-conquer itſelf. But had the Venetians attended more to their marine, and confined their conqueſts to their iſlands, without puſhing into the continent of Italy and Dalmatia, they had given leſs umbrage to the other ſtates of Europe, and had more eaſily maintained their own.

Whether the whole continent of North America be too large a conqueſt for Britain to graſp at, may poſſibly be a queſtion. But whether Martinico, whoſe exports are of ten times greater value to our enemies than thoſe of Canada, and which may be kept by England for a tenth part of the expence, be too great a conqueſt for it, never ſurely can be a queſtion. At a time, therefore, when we are felicitating ourſelves upon the reduction of a whole continent, and when the moſt favoured addreſſes had digeſted ſo vaſt a meal, nothing which may have been ſaid about ſickneſs and diſeaſe, can conclude againſt our conquering an iſland for fear of a ſurfeit.

Our preſent iſlands lie each of them expoſed to much larger ones of our enemies, and are therefore neceſſarily calling upon us for a fleet, to ſerve as a portable garriſon for their protection. By annexing Guadalupe and Martinico to them, we ſhall ſecure our preſent little iſlands under the ſhelter of

theſe large ones ; and by extending our poſſeſſions, ſhall really leſſen our frontiers. Inſtead of having the French and Spaniards both to guard againſt, we ſhall thereby in a manner get rid of the French, by whom alone we can ever be endangered, and have only the Spaniards to guard againſt, who know that they have much more to loſe themſelves by war, than they can hope to gain from us.

Can theſe iſlands ſet up for independence ? Are they leſs acceſſable to our fleets, or leſs amenable to our juriſdiction, than the midland foreſts of America ? Will they require *that infinity of ſtores*, which we have heard complained of, *as taking up ſo great a part of our fleet to ſupply them ?* Will their kinds of produce interfere with thoſe of England, or with thoſe of our preſent vaſt northern Colonies ? Theſe therefore, are not the conqueſts which will turn to diſeaſe. On the contrary, ſugar, rum, cotton, indigo, coffee, and cinnamon, make of all other commodities the moſt proper food for the commerce of Britain, which it can the moſt eaſily digeſt, and turn into the richeſt nouriſhment.

If it be really matter of doubt, whether we have not already over-conquered ourſelves ; what then are the twelve millions for ? Are they all to be conſumed in Germany, where only there is no poſſibility of our making any conqueſt at all ?

 I ſhall

I ſhall be very thankful, it has been ſaid, *to proceed to a treaty with all thoſe conqueſts in our hands, which we now have.* Can our enemies then take them out of our hands during the war? Might we not, when we proceed to a treaty, find ourſelves upon better terms with our rivals, if Martinico alſo were in our hands, rather than theirs? Are they not the more likely to leave us one, for our having both in our poſſeſſion, and holding the rod over their part of St. Domingo, as they have done over us in Germany? Would not our own people be better ſatisfied with the giving up of one, for our retaining of the other? In the preſent increaſe of our northern colonies, can we well do without one of them? Are theſe to depend on French iſlands for the conſumption of their produce? Are we to people the vaſt continent of America for the French to have the benefit of ſupplying it? or only to enlarge the market for the planters of our preſent Iſlands? to render them ſo much the leſs capable of rivalling the French in any foreign markets, and make them more entirely maſters of our own? To be braved with property in *more than fourteen counties*, and double that influence in our councils, which is already ſo predominant? *

There

* The reader will apply this reaſoning to the importance of our fixing our property in, and ſettling of, what are falſely call'd the Neutral Iſlands: if indeed, after all our conqueſts,

There has another danger been mentioned, that of giving umbrage to other nations, by puſhing our conqueſts too far. But whatever may have been

conqueſts, we muſt give up Guadalupe to our German dependencies.— Our preſent iſlands never have produced much more ſugars than are neceſſary for our own Britiſh conſumption Unleſs therefore in our future treaty, the two great objects of the war be attended to; and ſome check given to the growth of the French fiſhery in Newfoundland (which, from the time of its firſt diſcovery to this day, has been acknowledged in every treaty to be ours; and which Lord Oxford was impeach'd † for allowing to the French the uſe of the north part of) and ſome increaſe made to the Engliſh growth of Sugar, and ſhipping in the Weſt Indies; we may very poſſibly in a few years ſee the French marine riſing up to an equality with our own: and may then find too much employment for our ſhips at home, to be able to ſpare any for the protection of diſtant little defenceleſs iſlands. Or ſhould we after that ſee a French garriſon in Cape Breton, or any other fortified iſland, and a French fleet interrupting our Newfoundland fiſhery, under pretence of protecting their own; and a French army ready to march into Weſtphalia, the nation may then at length be too well convinced, that after boaſting of our conqueſts all the world over, we have given up the moſt valuable part of them; and have ſpent ſixty millions of our treaſure, to enlarge the market for, and enhance the price of Jamaica ſugars.

† See the 13th article of the treaty of Utrecht, and the 13th article of Lord Oxford's impeachment.

ſaid

ſaid on this head, cannot refer to the Weſt-Indies. When we have already been diſguſting all the northern powers by a land war in Germany, we cannot ſurely have any real apprehenſion of danger in our keeping down the French marine in the Weſt-Indies, for fear of giving umbrage to the Spaniards; when that Spaniſh power never can be formidable to Britain, but in conjunction with the French. *

After all, we readily admit the juſtneſs of temperate maxims, and acknowledge that there is a moderation which every State ought to obſerve. But is this moderation in our councils to be confined only to our acquiſitions, and not at all to regard our out-goings? Muſt it not therefore ſeem a little hard to a common underſtanding, and ought it not to ſting the breaſt of every good man, to obſerve that at that very time, when by advancing to twelve millions inſtead of eight, we declare that we have hitherto not done enough for Germany; we ſhould chuſe, at that very time, to expreſs our apprehenſions, that we may have already done too much for Britain, or that we cannot hereafter do too little for ourſelves.

* So very different was the language of laſt year from the preſent.

There

THERE is a remarkable obſervation, which ariſes from conſidering the particular time, when this argument was made uſe of.

We were not to conquer Martinico; an Iſland, which would yield us the largeſt returns, and could liberally pay us for the expence of keeping it; for fear of *over-conquering* ourſelves, and yet we now know, that at that very time, and for ſeveral months after, the public was amuſed with an expedition againſt another Iſland; which having only a bad road, and no harbour, could anſwer no one good purpoſe, and tended only to divide our force, and multiply our expence; and which was therefore a conqueſt of that very kind, which has the moſt direct tendency to hurt us. For a moment let us ſuppoſe, that we had gone on in the ſame courſe; and conquered firſt Oleron, and then the Iſle of Rhé. Fifteen thouſand men would have been wanted to garriſon theſe. The national defence would have been thereby ſo much weakened; and theſe men would have been kept upon the enemies coaſt, to ſpend their pay upon French produce, and would have required a fleet of victuallers, as thoſe of Belliſle now do, to preſerve them from ſtarving, and a ſquadron of men of war to prevent the French from landing and carrying them off.

I have one more obſervation to make on this head. In the laſt Seſſions, as well as in this, the German war was repreſented as a war of diverſion. But we know now by the event, what was then the object of our councils. He therefore who ſhall then have ſaid that the German war was to divert the French force, and thereby favour the Engliſh operations elſewhere, muſt then have ſaid nothing better, than that he reſolved to ſpend ſeven millions of the national treaſure in Germany, to prevent the French from ſending ſuccours to Canada, which we had already conquered, or to Martinico, which we did not intend to attack; or elſe that all this expence was incurred merely to favour the Conqueſt of Belliſle. A conqueſt, which, we ſee by the Negotiations, our enemies laugh at us for having made, and will ſcarce take again, when we offer it them.

Was then the German war intended to divert the French force from invading us? This, I think, is now the argument in faſhion; and therefore, though I have already obviated every thing, which has ſince been offered on this head, yet it may deſerve to be re-conſidered.

THE

ARGUMENT for the GERMAN WAR,

As a DIVERSION, Re-conſidered.

"NONE but ſuch as are unacquainted with the maritime force of England, can believe that, without a diverſion on the continent to employ part of the enemy's force, ſhe is not in a condition to hope for ſucceſs, and maintain her ſuperiority at ſea.——They muſt be very ignorant indeed, who imagine that the forces of England are not able to reſiſt thoſe of France, unleſs the latter be hindered from turning all her efforts to the ſea."

The King of England's Conduct as Elector of Hanover: in anſwer to the parallel of the conduct of France with that of the King of England, Elector of Hanover, in the year 1758.

I Have often thought with myſelf, what could be the motives which induced the late Miniſter to embark the nation ſo deeply in a German war. The opinion of its being a religious one has been long exploded. After enquiring of my friends what were the reaſons, which he himſelf, when he was in power, uſed to give for this meaſure, I never could hear of more than theſe two. The one, that he found us in Germany, and did not carry us thither; the other, that the German war is a diverſion of the French Forces, and enables us to exert our own in diſtant operations without fear of an invaſion. Upon theſe two reaſons taken together, one naturally aſks, if this ſecond reaſon be a good one for going into Germany, what need is there for apologizing for it by the firſt, and ſaying that he found us there: wiſdom is juſtified of itſelf, and looks not to accident for its ſupport. But the aſſigning of two oppoſite motives for the ſame action, is apt to create a doubt whether either of them be the true one. What may be the caſe here, the reader will enable himſelf to judge by a few plain obſervations.

In

In the firſt place then, whoever ſuppoſes the German war to be a wiſe and eligible meaſure, as a diverſion of the French from invading us, muſt ſuppoſe, that there really exiſts a probability of danger. I don't inſiſt that the probability of ſuch invaſion ſhould be great, but ſome probability there muſt be, greater or leſs; becauſe mere phyſical poſſibilities are no motives of action.

In the next place I obſerve, that if the German war be really choſen as a war of diverſion to keep the French from invading us (or from ſuccouring their colonies, or invading ours, for this argument will equally hold good in all theſe three caſes) then that diverſion will be more or leſs neceſſary, in proportion as the danger is greater or leſs; and a Miniſter will certainly preſs moſt for the war of diverſion at thoſe times, when the danger of invaſion is greateſt; and be leſs concerned about ſuch a diverſion, at thoſe times, when there is leſs danger of invaſion.

The danger to England of being invaded by France is greater or leſs, according to the number of their troops and of their ſhips. As to troops, France, in time of peace, has never leſs than two hundred thouſand men in its pay, and muſt therefore always have ſoldiers enough for an invaſion of England, which ordinarily does not keep up twenty thouſand. The real danger therefore to England muſt

be in proportion to the numbers of troops which the French have actually upon their coasts, and the number of their transports to carry them, and of ships of war to protect them: or, in other words, in proportion to the strength of their navy. These are such plain axioms, that the reader, I suppose, will rather condemn the mentioning them, than be inclined to dispute them. Now then let us see how the past events will quadrate with the opinion that this has been the motive for the German war.

In the beginning of the English war the "*French* "*were preparing a great fleet at Brest and Rochfort,* "*restoring Dunkirk, marching down an hundred and* "*twenty battalions to their coasts, and all the roads* "*to Flanders, Normandy, and Britany, were cover-* "*ed with carriages laden with cannon and arms,* "*and all the apparatus for some great enterprize* "*then in hand*;" which, says the Memorial for the requisition of the Dutch troops, *can be no other than a descent upon Great Britain.* I don't enter into the question, whether the real intention of the French was to invade us, or only to fright us, perhaps to invade, if their fleet should be ready before ours, or else to go to Minorca and Louisburg: but whatever were their intention, all that my argument requires is, that there was an appearance at least of danger.

Every

Every one now, who is in the leaſt acquainted with our parliamentary debates, muſt know, that during all this time, while the French fleet was the moſt formidable, and when our fleet and army were not yet arrived at much more than half of their preſent ſtrength; every one, I ſay, knows, that during the year 1755 and 1756, this Gentleman and his friends were continually inveighing againſt a continental war, and all our German operations. They ſpoke, they wrote, they were turned out, and received their gold boxes upon that account. It was then repreſented as a betraying the intereſt of their country to fight for Hanover; or to hire Heſſian and Ruſſian ſoldiers for that purpoſe.

Thus things continued till the end of the year 1757, by which time the enemy's naval force was greatly broken; we had many of their ſhips in our ports, and more than half their ſeamen in our priſons. Our army was ſtrengthened by the raiſing a great number of new battalions, and our ſhips and ſeamen all in full vigour. Then it was that this gentleman's mind became ſuddenly illumin'd: and as the dangers of an invaſion grew leſs, he now perceived the neceſſity of a diverſion in Germany to grow greater; and having diſgraced a General of our own Royal Family, for having been too good an Engliſhman, and put an end to the firſt German war by the treaty of Cloſter Seven,

which

which he then called an infamous padlock put upon the Hanoverian ſwords, he entered upon a new German war of double the extent, and quadruple the expence.

Far be it from me to judge of other men's profeſſions; but it is impoſſible not to lament the imbecility of the human mind, when we ſee a great patriot, who had long ſtood firm on an Engliſh baſis, all at once fall off to a German intereſt, and then bewilder himſelf with an imagination, that though in the beginning of the war, when the French navy was in its greateſt ſtrength, and our's weakeſt, we did not want any ſuch diverſion for our ſecurity; yet now that the French navy was reduced, and the Engliſh every where triumphant, we ought to run into a German war, as a neceſſary precaution to divert the French armies from invading us.

Once indeed, ſince that time, our enemies had got together a fleet, and having that, they found no difficulty in bringing down twenty thouſand men to their coaſts. The German war was not ſuch a diverſion to their arms, but that in three months time after our boaſted victory at Minden, when this diverſion was in its greateſt force, the French formed the deſign of invading us. And having once provided ſhips, they had men enough to embark on board them to anſwer any purpoſe either

of

of ſuccouring Canada, or invading Ireland, ſtill facing us in Germany with an army ſuperior to ours. By the ſea-fight off Belleiſle, their navy has been entirely broken, ſo as to render it irrecoverable during the preſent war. Without ſhips, without ſeamen, and without trade, how is it poſſible for them to raiſe a marine, which can be in the leaſt degree formidable to ours? From that time therefore the German war, far from being a diverſion of the French force from invading us, has been nothing but a diverſion of the Engliſh treaſure to exhauſt us: Yet ever ſince the battle of Minden, the whole force of our efforts has been employed in Germany. With forty millions ſpent, ſcarce a ſingle new expedition of any valuable conſequence to Britain was attempted in two years after that time. Martinico, and even St. Lucia, remained untouched. Inſtead of ſending our forces abroad to ſuch inviting conqueſts, we have been trifling near home in an iſland, without harbour, and without produce; which we now ſee neither our enemies by the loſs of it, nor we by the poſſeſſion of it, have yet found the uſe of. Only one regiment has been ſent to the Eaſt Indies; and notwithſtanding the ſuperior advantages we have for ſending ſhips and men thither, all our ſucceſſes in thoſe parts have been obtained with an inferior force. While ſix millions have been ſpent on the German war, twenty thouſand pounds only has been

been voted for the Eaſt Indian. The falling ſtate of our funds, and of our treaty, both ſhew what this German diverſion tends to. Shall we find the produce of Heſſe and Hanau equal to that of Guadaloupe? Or will the opening the navigation of the Rhine and the Maine prove as great a nurſery for French ſeamen as the trade of Newfoundland? Already had we, in our treaty, given up for Germany all the advantages we had gained in the fiſhery and the ſugar trade: and ſhould this ſame war of diverſion go on much longer, we ſhall find, that inſtead of fighting in Germany for America, we ſhall have really loſt America in Germany. Whatever may have been the caſe before, yet now that the French marine is totally ſunk, ſhould any one now affirm, that a German war is neceſſary for us as a diverſion; when then is it to become leſs neceſſary? or when are we to be without one? But ſhould any gentleman, who in the beginning, when the French navy was in full vigour, was the moſt earneſt pleader againſt a German war, be now the moſt poſitive for it; ſuch an one may, if he pleaſes, value himſelf upon his former firmneſs, in not fearing danger, where it poſſibly was; but it will be hard to prove the merit of having put us to an expence of twenty millions, to prevent it, where it certainly was not. Admit that the French invaſion in the beginning of the war was but a ſpectre, yet even ſpectres may be allowed to fright by their firſt ſudden appearance. But with ill grace

ſhall he boaſt his fortitude, who in the very act of triumphing over others for their ſudden fears, can own, that this ſpectre, long ſince laid to every other eye, has for four years together ſtill appeared to his: That uſe and time cannot recover him from its terrors, but the longer he beholds it he fears it ſo much the more; and after having already parted with four, five, and ſix millions, is now ſweating out the laſt eight millions under the dread of it.

THE following liſt of French ſhips, taken or deſtroyed in the courſe of this war, was publiſhed a few weeks ago in the papers. I don't anſwer for its exactneſs: but if it be near to the truth, it ſhews how very powerful our enemy's navy will grow in a few years interval of peace, and how little we have to fear from it, during the reſt of the war.

D A LIST

A LIST of

Ships taken from the French from the beginning of the war to the 1st of October, 1761.

Ships.		Numb. of Guns.		
4	——	84		
14	——	74		
2	——	66		
17	——	64		
1	——	58	Line of battle	47
2	——	56		
1	——	54		
6	——	50		
4	——	44		
2	——	40		
19	——	36		
1	——	34		
13	——	32		
3	——	28		
2	——	26		
7	——	24		
3	——	22	Frigates	84
7	——	20		
11	——	18		
7	——	16		
4	——	14		
2	——	12		
1	——	10		
8	——	8		

ADDITIONS

FOR THE

SIXTH EDITION of the

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

PRESENT GERMAN WAR:

Which the AUTHOR thinks a Full Reply to all which has been objected by his numerous Anſwerers:

ADDENDA

TO THE

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

GERMAN WAR,

(Printed in May laſt.)

PAGE 14. line 15. This independency of the ſeveral German States eſtabliſhed by the treaty of Weſtphalia, is what the German Princes call the liberties, and conſtitution of Germany *.

* The guarding againſt any events, *which may ſhake the conſtitution, or overturn the ſyſtem of the Empire*; or in other words, the preſervation of their own independence, may be a very intereſting concern to the ſeveral German Princes in their own German Diet at Ratiſbon: but was never made an object of a Britiſh parliament's regard, till the end of the year 1756: when by a fatal miſtake of a French intereſt for an Engliſh one, it was propoſed as a motive for the preſent German War. *The unnatural union of councils abroad, the calamities, which in conſequence of this unhappy conjunction, may, by the irruptions of foreign armies into the empire, ſhake its conſtitution, overturn its ſyſtem, and threaten oppreſſion to the proteſtant intereſt there,*

are,

are events, which muſt ſenſibly affect the minds of the nation, and have fixed the eyes of Europe on this new and dangerous criſis. Till that time, when we firſt openly avowed the cauſe of the petty German Princes, the intereſt of England, and the peace of Europe had always led us to wiſh rather to ſee ſome one great power eſtabliſhed in Germany, which ſhould be the natural rival of, and balance againſt the power of France.

Page 31. Is there any ſort of œconomy in our having in three years time put ourſelves to an expence of twelve millions, to prevent France from getting ſix hundred thouſand pounds out of Germany ? *

* One of my foreign anſwerers (whoſe work, Le Faux Patriote Anglois, I hoped to have ſeen done out of French for the benefit of the Engliſh reader) accuſes me of reaſoning as a merchant, and makes here the following remarks: " I leave you, Sir, to judge if this is the right " way of calculating in affairs of general politics: whe- " ther ſome pounds ſterling more or leſs ought to regulate " the determinations of cabinets." Page 50.———And again:

" If the electorate were now in the ſame ſtate of im- " becility, in which it was, when its ſovereigns were " called to the crown of England; its falling under the " dominion of a new potentate, would perhaps be in itſelf " a matter of indifference: But Hanover is now no lon- " ger an inconſiderable power: it has great influence on " the affairs of Germany. Since its electors have become " kings of England, the riches, which they have made to " paſs into that country, have given it a much greater " degree

" degree of force than it had before; and the ſtate by be-
" ing wealthier is become more powerful. The reſiſt-
" ance it has made to France in this war, is a convin-
" cing proof of this." Page 68.

This anſwerer, I ſuppoſe, does not know that the electoral troops are paid and fed by the Engliſh parliament.

He goes on, page 71. " The Engliſh nation has often
" complained of this diſpoſition of things, which obliges
" it againſt its will to maintain great armies in Germany,
" to ſupport the rights of a dominion not belonging to it:
" but they forget that this evil is in a manner incorpo-
" rated with the ſtate. For that monarchy, it would no
" doubt be a deſirable thing to have no poſſeſſions out of
" its own continent, to the end that its power, by being
" concentrated within its own iſland, might be able to act
" with the greater force; but a certain arrangement of
" ſecond cauſes has diſpoſed things otherwiſe.———It is
" not my buſineſs to examine, whether the Engliſh, when
" they expelled king James, had not better have ſub-
" mitted either to a ſtate of ſlavery or a civil war, rather
" than to have choſen a king, who having political in-
" tereſts in Germany, diſtinct from thoſe of their nation,
" muſt neceſſarily draw them into wars, which were not
" their own: it is enough for me to ſay, that the nation
" determined to take a ſovereign of the preſent reigning
" family. If the misfortune was inevitable in its cauſe,
" it could not but be ſo in its effect."

Again, page 73. " It is with ſtates as with private per-
" ſons: they are never without ſome inquietude. In po-
" litics, as well as morals, the ſeat of evil is never void.
" If England had not this gnawing worm, ſhe might have
" ſome

" ſome other: every government, we may ſay, has its ori-
" ginal ſin. According to the preſent ſtate of Europe,
" the original ſin of Portugal is in Spain, of Venice in
" Turky, of Genoa in Corſica, of Denmark in Sweden,
" of the Houſe of Auſtria at all times in that of Bourbon,
" of the empire in the Germanic body, of France in the
" marine of England, and of England in the inconveni-
" encies which ariſe from the poſſeſſion of Hanover."
Thus far the anſwerer.

We have all of us, I ſuppoſe, lamented, that our German friends have ſo long been making their *profit* of us; but it would have been more prudent ſurely for them to have concealed their intending now to plead preſcription, and make us their *property*.

Page 74. Is it poſſible not to ſee the inequality in the number of men at leaſt, which there is between us and our enemies? *

* The kingdom of France, in time of peace, has not leſs than two hundred thouſand men in its land ſervice: Britain has never yet kept up thirty thouſand in its land and ſea-ſervice both put together. Let it, with the Iriſh eſtabliſhment, be forty thouſand. The ordinary land force of France therefore, with the addition of Saxon, Wirtemberg, and other corps, *natives of Germany, and inured to the food and climate of that country*, as much as the Heſſians and Hanoverians, has furniſhed every year of the war hitherto an army ſuperior to ours. Britain maintains in this war above two hundred thouſand of its natives in its pay. In which country then has the war taken off the moſt hands from its agriculture and manufactures? Or which country can beſt afford to ſend its ſubjects to cut each others

others throats, or rot in the hoſpitals of Germany? Admitting that France has there fifty thouſand of its natives, out of its ordinary land force of two hundred thouſand; England has four and twenty thouſand, whoſe ordinary land force, Iriſh included, has been under thirty thouſand. Can we the better afford to expoſe four and twenty thouſand of our natives in a German war, for our having a hundred and eighty thouſand neceſſarily employed in our own? Is the French extraordinary draft from the loom and the plow equal to ours? Should we wiſh to ſee here in England, Italian, Swiſs, German, Walloon, and Iriſh brigades, to ſupply the place of our countrymen, employed, either about our own ſervice in America, or in a foreign intereſt elſewhere?

Page 76. The ordinary revenue of the French, if they have ſeven millions, will enable them on the preſent plan of the war, to bring more men into the field, without borrowing at all, than we can by getting every year eight millions in debt *.

* I have hitherto given what appeared to me, to be much the moſt favourable turn to this argument. But if my anſwerers chooſe it, let us now ſtate it in their own manner. The revenue of France, we have again been told this year, is but nine millions: two of theſe are to ariſe out of funds, which are already over-burdened; and poſſibly therefore may produce but one. Suppoſe then the whole to be eight millions. Let the half of theſe be taken up in the maintenance of their civil government, their fleet, their inland forces, and their numerous fortifications and garriſons, through that vaſt extent of their frontier to Spain, Italy, Germany, and Flanders, and through their north and weſt coaſt from Oſtend to Bayonne. Beſide

ſide this, notwithſtanding all our ſucceſſes in the Eaſt-Indies, France has met us there, with a ſuperior force, in every engagement hitherto both at ſea and land; what then muſt remain out of theſe eight millions for the payment of Swediſh, Ruſſian, and German ſubſidies, and the maintenance of the war in Germany? We may make this ſum as little as we pleaſe; yet the fact we know has been, that the French have every year brought into the field there a number of men greatly ſuperior to ours. My anſwerers have aſſumed two ſuppoſitions, which directly contradict each other; the one is, that France *has* much leſs than we, the other is that it *ſpends* a great deal more. They are welcome to one of them, and to make their choice of either; but the old axiom, *Nemo dat quod non habet*, will not admit of their taking both.

Page 86. What then was the foundation of thoſe vain boaſts, which were given out in the beginning of every ſeſſion, that the French are ruined, and the next German campaign muſt be their laſt? *

* " *France is* ſinking; ſhe knows herſelf ſinking; this " *is the laſt* effort of a dying power; 'tis the convulſion " of *death*, the effort of *deſpair*: let us but reſiſt it firmly, " let us act with the vigour of ſucceſs, and we need not " fear any thing ſhe can do from deſpair.

" *The war in* Germany has given us elbow-room: " the *victory of Minden* has made way for the conqueſt " *of America*: the operations in Germany has given *us* " *the elbow-room of a year.*"

Such was the confidence of our preſumption, and ſuch were the flowers of oratory, which ſhot up early the next ſpring after the battle of Minden. Yet with all that elbow-room, our Britiſh war during the next year totally languiſhed: not a ſingle ſquadron in eighteen months after ſailed for any new Britiſh conqueſt; nor was a ſingle brigade ſent out on any other than a German ſervice. Far from gaining elbow-room, our arms have been pinion'd down to the defence of Hanover: while the French were cramping our trade in the courſe of that year more than in any preceding one, by their privateers in our own ſeas; and the Martinicans were braving us to conquer them, and by taking two hundred of our ſhips with the privateers of that iſland, were daily reminding us of the importance of making it ours.

Page 99. Conſidering it merely as a treaty for the hire of troops, it was much cheaper than any we have made ſince. *

* We have already mentioned the pay of the year 1759: but the ſeveral articles of our German expence have been ſo carefully concealed, that there is no judging of the account of a campaign, till the end of the following ſeſſions. By the reſolutions of the 27th of November and 20th of December, it appears that we paid to the Landgrave 426,725 l. for 19,012 men. The Hanoverians for nearly the ſame ſum (447,882 l.) furniſhed us with more than double that number (38,750 men). The price of 55,000 Ruſſians (excluſive of any allowance for the galleys and greater proportion of horſe) would at the ſame rate amount to 1,230,000l. ſo much more temperate in their demands are Hanoverians than

than Heſſians, and Ruſſians than either of them. Theſe laſt were to have maintained themſelves, not only in their own country, but when they marched out of it: but our German friends expect that we ſhould feed them at their own homes; and, by an article, lucrative enough for mercenaries, but unknown among allies, have learned to double their demands upon us for forage and extraordinaries. Should the reader ſtill wonder at the diſproportion of theſe ſums, he will recollect that very ſingular one of ſixty thouſand pounds, which in the affluence of our millions, was given, *to be paid as his moſt ſerene Highneſs ſhall think it moſt convenient, in order to facilitate the means, by which the moſt ſerene Landgrave may again fix his reſidence in his own dominions; and give freſh courage to his faithful ſubjects by his preſence, which is ſo much wiſhed for.* Whatever may have been our compaſſion the former year, for an old gentleman returning from Hamburgh to his own houſe; men muſt have winked extremely hard on theſe fine words, to renew the grant a ſecond time in the very ſame form, when the old Landgrave's reſidence was already fixed at his own houſe, or rather he was dying at Rintelen; and when his ſon, being a new converted papiſt, might not have his preſence ſo much wiſh'd for by his more faithful proteſtant ſubjects.

This firſt charge of ſixty thouſand pounds was ſubmitted to, upon account of the merit of having got rid of a word, ſaid to be of dangerous import in the former treaty, *Dedommagement*: when by the convention of the 1ſt of April, the nation was much more effectually bound to take upon itſelf *a reaſonable ſuccour in money* of four times the ſum.

The whole Heſſian account therefore for the year 1760 ſtands thus:

	l.	s.	d.
For 19,012 Heſſians - -	366,725	1	6
For a 2d facilitating the means of the ſerene Landgrave's fixing his reſidence at his own houſe nine months after he had not been out of it, - - - -	60,000	0	0
For two augmentations of his troops, amounting to 3392 men -	121,872	8	7
For the Heſſian ſhare of forage and extraordinaries, being one fourth of 2,167,903 l. 12 s. 6 d. -	541,975	18	1
For releaſing the Landgrave's enemies from a Dedommagement, and taking upon ourſelves the obligation to grant him a reaſonable ſuccour in money - -	220,000	0	0
	1,310,573	8	2

Upon comparing therefore the rates of the two treaties, it appears that Britain pays as much money for 22,404 Heſſians, as would have purchaſed 142,000 Ruſſians. So inattentive has our eaſe of borrowing made us to the value of our money.

The number of Heſſian troops which we are to pay for is ſtated in the *Votes* to be 22,464; but no one, it is hoped,

hoped, will think the author weak enough to imagine, that that number really exiſted any *where elſe*. The noble lord, who was *officially* charged with the defence of them, when the houſe was to grant the 220,000 pounds, had too great a regard for his honour, to ſay, that there was any ſuch number in the field; or that he had received any regular return of them. Even the return, which had been made up and ſent him that morning by the Heſſian miniſter for the occaſion, could not raiſe their number to more than 16,000 men, and 466 muſicians; and the general opinion of the houſe ſeemed to ſet it much lower. It was indeed ſaid, that they were not much more deficient than the Engliſh troops. But we have an army here at home, on purpoſe to ſerve as a nurſery for the German conſumption, from which drafts can be made all the ſummer without obſervation. Whereas the defect of theſe Heſſian troops is irremediable; becauſe our enemies, being in poſſeſſion of the country, chooſe to take all the young fellows of it into their own army, rather than ſend them to ours. One of my anſwerers has ſaid, *that France ſubſidizes more powers than we do, and in all probable conjecture at a much higher price.* It would have been ſome conſolation to us, if inſtead of groundleſs conjecture, he had produced an inſtance of the French ſubſidizing to the half of this heighth. We know the rate of Ruſſian ſubſidies. Do the Wirtemberg riſe to a fourth of our Heſſian? Will the French ſuffer that duke to take their money, while we take his men?

Should the reader object to this laſt article of 220,000 l. being charged to the account of the year 1760, he will conſider that the expence incurred by the French contributions was in that year. We ſhall have a new bill of charges made out for their inroads next ſummer, if indeed the next parliament will ſubmit to pay it.

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If the poor ſufferers are to have this money, 'twere to to be wiſh'd at leaſt, that it may not be diſtributed among them, till the end of the war. The giving it them now, will be only rendering them ſo much the more tempting a bait for the French to come and eat them up again, and enabling the Landgrave to prove againſt us ſo much the greater damages. It would be enriching the enemy at the Engliſh coſt, and inflaming our future reckoning with the loſs of our own money. Far be it however from me to imagine, that the ſerene Landgrave, with his known humanity and tenderneſs, will not diſtribute it among the poor ſufferers; and farther ſtill that it was intended here that he ſhould put it all into his own pocket. That would carry in it too much of the idea of a ſet of proteſtants bargaining with a popiſh ſovereign for the ruin of his proteſtant ſubjects.

THE foregoing notes were all written during the laſt Seſſions, but the author had intended to have done with this ſubject. It is now with extreme regret, that he finds it neceſſary to appeal to the public to judge, whether every thing which was advanced in theſe Conſiderations the laſt year, has not been verified by the experience of this. We have actually ſpent twenty millions: are our enemies brought at all the nearer towards giving us a peace? The greateſt part of theſe have been employed in Germany, and in ſervices relative thereto. Montreal was taken laſt year, and Pondicherry the very beginning of this: not a Shilling therefore of theſe twenty millions has been uſed in either of theſe ſervices. Yet tho' ſo much of the ſtrength of government has been exerted in Germany, the French force there during the whole of this ſummer, as well as in all the foregoing ones, has been greatly ſuperior to ours. The diſſenſions among their commanders, and the ſingle valour of the Britiſh troops, have now a ſecond time prevented their defeating us, as before at Minden. This has been pompouſly repreſented to the public as a great victory? But what did Britain gain by this victory? Was it worth to us even the value of the candles, which we burnt in the illuminations for it? Did the French court fall in their demands after the battle of Fellinghauſen? or did we?

Some of his anſwerers have charged the author with arrogance, for preſuming to differ from the public wiſdom. One good man, after acquainting us, that his life is chiefly ſpent in his chambers at Edinburgh, ſends us up from thence the ſenſe of the nation; and wonders that any private man ſhould contradict, what has been the reſult of ſuch frequent debates in the Britiſh parliament. Such men perhaps will be ſurprized to hear, that the late parliament, tho' it granted away ſeventy eight millions of the public treaſure, yet from the time of ſending the firſt troops thither never had the queſtion in debate, whether the war in Germany, and the ſending over the Britiſh forces, was a right meaſure or a wrong one. All the great men in the kingdom, had either at the end of the laſt war, or in the beginning of this, declared it was a wrong thing: not one great man in the laſt parliament offered at an argument to prove it a right one.

There is a mode and faſhion in thinking, which is apt to hurry men out of the poſſeſſion of their better judgment. But ſeven years ago the very thought of ſending our troops into Germany would not have been born. Is there any intelligent man living, who, if at that time he had been aſked, whether it would be right for Britain ſingly to engage in a land war with France, Germany, Sweden, and Ruſſia; would not have thought the propoſer of ſuch a queſtion mad, and turned from him with

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the utmoſt diſdain ? Did not the one part of our adminiſtration profeſs themſelves at the end of the laſt war, convinced of the folly of fighting other nations battles; and declare that for the future the powers of the continent muſt learn to take care of themſelves ? and did they not reſolve never again to involve their country in any ſuch foreign German quarrels ? Did not the other part of our adminiſtrations at the beginning of this war, ſpeak, write, proteſt, and even reſign upon the ſame account ? And yet all the extravagancies of paſt wars have been tripled in this, and that by the very *party* whoſe ſpeeches are well remembred, and whoſe writings are ſtill extant, foretelling all the evils, which we now ſuffer. *

Did we not in one place hear a famous ſpeech end with a wiſh, that the *word Hanover was expunged out of the Engliſh Dictionary* ? And have we not

* See a very excellent pamphlet call'd Deliberate thoughts on the ſyſtem of our late treaties with Heſſe-Caſſel and Ruſſia. Printed for J. Scott in Pater-noſter-Row, 1756. Said to have been written by a gentleman who at that time came into place and went out again with the late miniſter.

I acknowledge him as an elder brother, and a much wiſer, though I had not ſeen his work till ſome months after the publiſhing of the Conſiderations.

in another ſeen a great commoner draw forth even a gouty right hand from its ſling in his boſom, and lay it upon the table, as the ſolemn pledge of his faith, that not a man ſhould be ſent to Hanover?

Little minds view every thing in the light of party; they read only to compliment their own ſagacity in finding out whether the writer be for or againſt the ſide they eſpouſe, and think no farther. Is then the honour of a great commoner, or the keeping three or four Peers in their places, a matter of higher importance, than the ſaving of our country? Do not both parties know, and ſecretly confeſs, that the nation was in the late reign ſacrificing the blood of its ſubjects and exhauſting its treaſures even to the brink of ruin in a quarrel, which did not belong to it: and to gratify the avarice of German Princes, every one of which have even in this preſent war been offering themſelves to France?

Did not the Duke of Brunſwick declare that he had negociated at Verſailles and at Vienna, and had agreed to lend the French his troops? * Did not the late Landgrave at the ſame time ſignify to that court, *that he deſired nothing more ardently than to attach himſelf wholly to France; and to make a treaty for that purpoſe.* Offering to that crown, his troops and his vote at the general and particular Dyets,

* See his expoſtulatory letter to Prince Ferdinand for carrying off his ſon from Hamburgh againſt his father's conſent.

to

to put an end to the troubles of the Empire. Has not this court of Heſſe been ever ſince threatning to leave us, as often as they wanted an increaſe of their ſubſidy? What elſe is the meaning of the ſpring treaties of the year 1759, 1760, and 1761? Or what leſs than this is implied in the reaſon which has been aſſigned for making them: That there was danger of the great enterprizes then in hand miſcarrying, if the Landgrave's demands had not been complied with? Have we not for three ſprings following, ſince our German general took the command, ſeen enterprizes formed by him, every one of which have miſcarried: the firſt it was ſaid by his own delay, the next by that of a Hanoverian general, and the laſt by the treachery of another ally, who never yet kept his faith with us: and every one of which, if they had ſuceeded, could not have brought the leaſt benefit to this country; but each of them had a direct tendency to amuſe the parliament then ſitting, to exhauſt the treaſury by a drain of two or three hundred thouſand pounds a month, and to give the German courts an opportunity to take advantage of our neceſſities, and raiſe their demands upon us.

Have not both parties, during the late reign, ſhewn but too great a compliance in bringing the nation into this ſtate of dependence? And when the public funds have been ſinking under the preſſure of more than a hundred millions of debt, have not each

ſhewn themſelves but too ready to heap on more to the load, if they could but lay the blame of it upon the other?

To talk of œconomy, whilſt we perſiſt in the ſame ruinous courſe, is only throwing duſt into the people's eyes. By attempting things impracticable, we have been ſubjecting ourſelves to the power of foreigners, whoſe ſole end is to plunder, and make the moſt of us, and we would then quarrel with others for ſuffering them. We give away the public treaſure by millions in one place, and then ſend our ſeconds down to another, to make a merit of œconomy about hundreds.

We have multiplied Commiſſaries without end and without uſe. At firſt the pay of one was thought too much. We then ſent eight, then ſix more, and then three more Commiſſaries of controul upon them. What has all this done, but only multiplied the expence? I mean not here to lay blame upon any one, but rather to commend. The combined force of both parts of the adminiſtration was exerted this ſummer, to put a ſtop to the exorbitant abuſes in the expence of forage and extraordinaries. Able men were ſought out for the employment of Commiſſaries of Controul. Very ſenſible and diſcerning men refuſed the offer; I doubt not but that the gentlemen who have accepted it, have done their utmoſt in the public ſervice. What

has

has been the fruit of their labours? The German army this year has been leſs numerous, and more expenſive than the foregoing. What can be done in a ruined country, where all hate us, and all, from the head to the loweſt, are in a combination to impoſe upon us? What can be hoped for in a ſervice, in which no one Prince upon earth has any common cauſe with us; where our allies, and even our Generals are all hired by their penſions, and have not the leaſt concern for any one thing belonging to us but our money.

Men may ſeek to get a name by talking of œconomy in the public hearing; but if they deſire to do good, let them apply their cure to the part where the evil grows, and plead for œconomy in thoſe courts, whoſe ſole aim hitherto has been to improve every advantage over us, which our neceſſities furniſhed them with. But to talk in public of œconomy, after having privately laid us at the mercy of a German chancery, is inſulting the nation in its diſtreſs, inſtead of relieving it. 'Tis the mode and the ſeat of the war (as was very juſtly obſerved) which muſt be changed, if we really mean to conſult œconomy. 'Tis the bringing it from the land to the ſea; from Germany to the French Weſt-Indies, which muſt ſhew a real public concern. But to plead for a German war, and then to talk of œconomy, is firſt creating an incurable evil, and then ſeeking a merit in calling out for a remedy.

I have

I have for the reader's ſatisfaction, extracted from the Votes the ſeveral grants for the hire and pay of our German army for the year 1760*. From it the expence of our Heſſian troops appears to be ſo exorbitantly great, as would have been incredible if we did not ſee the account.

The grand objection againſt ſending our national troops abroad in all former wars has been this, that we could hire a number of foreign troops for half the money which our own would coſt us: But ſo much is the value of Engliſhmen now ſunk, that we give for a Heſſian ſoldier double the price of a Britiſh one. Nay, ſo extremely improvident have we been, that we pay a much larger ſum for twenty-two thouſand Heſſians than the price of forty-three thouſand Wolfenbutlers, Hanoverians and Brunſwickers, or of an hundred thouſand Ruſſians †. Yet, at that very time, when in our treaties we were thus prodigal of the public treaſure, the defenders of them were perpetually declaiming about œconomy.

There are many among us, who are often talking of the expence of the militia. Why theſe country troops ſhould not be as good, and deſerve as much as any other, I confeſs I don't ſee. Thoſe men at leaſt ought to think well of them, who truſt them with our chief defence at home, while they are ſending our national troops to fight for a foreign intereſt

† See Page 28.

* GRANTS for the hire of foreign troops for the year 1760.

			l.	s.	d.	l.	s.	d.
1759. Nov. 27.	FOR 38750 Hanoverians, Wolfenbuttlers, Saxe-Gothans and Buckeburgers		447,882	10	5			
1760. Feb. 11.	For 1001 light horſe (Hanoverian)		34,333	8	0			
April 29.	For 959 horſe, 1454 foot	Brunſwickers	66,926	3	0¼			
29.	For a 1000 men Augmentation of ditto		23,843	5	11			
	43,164							
1760. Dec. 16.	To make good a deficiency in the ſum voted laſt ſeſſions for theſe troops		2,569	10	0			
						575,554	17	4¼
1759. Nov. 27.	For 2120 horſe, 9900 foot	Heſſians	268,874	16	8			
27.	For 920 horſe, 6072 foot	additional Heſſians	97,850	4	10			
1759. Dec. 20.	To facilitate the means by which the moſt ſerene Landgrave may again fix his reſidence in his own dominions		60,000	0	0			
1760. Feb. 11.	For 4 Squadrons of Heſſian hunters and huſſars		20,776	5	5			
April 29.	For a farther augmentation of Heſſian horſe and foot		101,096	3	2			
1761. March 7.	For a reaſonable ſuccour in money for damage done by the French in Heſſe, during the year 1760, ſettled at 120,000 l. to be paid immediately, and 100,000 l. more in two years		220,000	0	0			
						768,597	10	1
1760. April 29.	For 505 horſe, 2500 foot	An augmentation to the King's army of five battalions, conſiſting each of 101 horſe and 500 foot				52,902	19	2
	This is a corps ſaid to be compoſed of all nations, and of deſerters from all ſervices, which as no country in Germany will own them, is called the Britannic legion.					670,000	0	0
1759. Dec. 17.	To the King of Pruſſia							
1759. Nov. 27.	For 57,294 Engliſh troops, including thoſe in Germany 1,383,748 0 10.							
	For 24,000 Britiſh troops in Germany, reckoned only as one third of the above number		461,249	7	0	reckoned 500,000	0	0
	For forage and extraordinaries admitted the laſt ſeſſion to have been					2,167,903	12	6
						4,734958	19	1¼

			l.	s.	d.			
1759. Sept. 30.	For the ordinary of the ordnance for the land ſervice		230,296	4	6			
1760. Dec. 2.	For the extraordinaries of the ordnance of the land-ſervice in 1760		426,449	4	9			
			656,645	9	3			
	The proportion of this, chargeable to the German ſervice, is not aſcertained.							
1761. Dec. 9.	For tranſport-ſervice, and victualling land-forces, from the 1ſt Oct. 1759 to the 30th Sept. 1760		479,035	19	2			
	For one whole year's pay of the Heſſian troops, which the nation is bound for at the end of the war, by the treaty of the 1ſt April, 1760		200,000	0	0			
1761. Feb. 17.	To the Hanoverian chancery of war for bread, forage and firewood, furniſhed to the Heſſian troops in the year 1757 and 1758, being only the ballance of a much larger ſum	336,479 14 1						
	For the charge of the militia, which could not have been called out, if the national troops had not been ſent to Germany		472,833	1	4			
						1,808,514	9	9

[To face page 38.]

aſt in Germany. I have caſt up the ſums voted for the militia-ſervice for the year 1760; and all put together amount to 472,833 l. 1 s. 4 d. The reader may ſee them in the margin *.

But how juſtly ſoever this objection of greater expence may lie againſt a militia, thoſe gentlemen ſurely cannot be ſuppoſed to make it from any real concern for their country, who can quietly ſee and vote for the ſending more than double that ſum out of the kingdom to maintain little more than half the number of foreigners. Will any man hereafter talk of the expence of the militia, when we give more money for German Boors, than an equal number of militia would coſt, if they had every man the pay of an enſign?—Will a Britiſh parliament rate the ſervice of a German common ſoldier, equal to

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* 1759, November 6th, For the militia in South Britain and two Scotch battalions for 122 days, from 25th December, 1759, to 25th April, 1760 ——— —— 102006 4 8

1760, April 28th, For militia in England and Scotland to 24th Oct. 1760 260104 16 8

For cloathing of Ditto for the year 1760 —— —— 30,722 0 0

May 4th, For unembodied militia to the 25th March, 1761 ——— 80,000 0 0

472,833 1 4

* One quarter of this ſhould be deducted.

to that of an Engliſh officer, merely becauſe he is not fighting for England.

The reader will naturally ſuſpect that the 60,000 l. for bringing the Landgrave home is charged twice: but I have charged it no oftener than it is voted. Nor does it appear that the public has credit given it, by the return of either of them. Nor could it be intended to be returned for that year. The ſixty thouſand for the year 1760, was voted in the beginning of the Seſſions, December 18th, 1759, the ſeparate article promiſing an indemnification, was not made till the next April, and the protocol, which determined the ſum, which this reaſonable ſuccour ſhould amount to, was not ſigned till the 3d of May, 1761.

What then is it which the nation gains by the clauſe in the protocol, *(including therein the extraordinary ſubſidy?)* I anſwer, words, and nothing elſe. The Landgrave had received his ſixty thouſand pounds for the year 1760; he hoped to make a new demand of a reaſonable ſuccour for the French ravages in the year 1761, and he is content to renounce the claim of ſixty thouſand pounds hereafter, in order to intitle himſelf to aſk of us four times that ſum.

Others perhaps may object to the making theſe Heſſians debtor to one fourth of the charge of forage and extraordinaries; but their original number of twenty two thouſand four hundred and four is a quar-

ter

ter of the army; and the noble Lord, who by his office muſt have been the beſt acquainted with their ſeveral returns, informed his hearers that he believed that the Heſſians were as compleat as the ſeveral other corps; 1,310,573 pounds therefore, divided by 16000, give an allowance of 81 l. 18 d. 3 d. a man. The odd money will make up for the greater pay of the officers, and leave eighty pounds a man for the common ſoldiers. So hardly has the nation been ground between our negotiators and our allies. But this is far from being the whole of their expence to us. I have inſerted in the account an article of 336,479 l. 14 s. 1 d. for bread, forage, and firewood to the Heſſians, but have not added it; becauſe it does not properly belong to the account of the year 1760, but of two foregoing years: 'tis here inſerted only to give the reader an idea of the arrears which the nation has to expect to be brought in at the end of the war. 'Tis ſaid that there are many ſuch articles. One very extraordinary one, to the amount of ſome hundred thouſand pounds, appears in the Heſſian treaty for the year 1760, by which the public is bound to give the Landgrave a year's pay after the end of the war. I have read over a dozen ſubſidy treaties, the far greater part of the ſubſidy treaties made ſince the Revolution, not one of which has any ſuch article. The moſt which has ever been given at diſmiſſion has been a month's pay. But our great Miniſter, whoſe chief meaſure of greatneſs in his plans,

ſeems to have been the greatneſs of their expence, has given to the Landgrave no leſs than twelve months pay. Yet ſo implicitly was the laſt parliament guided, that the public ſeems never to have taken notice of it.

Theſe troops are now ſaid to be ſtill more defective in their muſters: But even on the former ſtate of them, they are a leſs numerous corps, than the clergy of this kingdom. I have now before me an eſtimate of the preſent value of all the eccleſiaſtical livings in the iſland; and after caſting up the ſeveral incomes of our Archbiſhops, Biſhops, Deans, Archdeacons, Prebendaries, Rectors, and Vicars, the value of the whole (with that of the Kirk of Scotland thrown into it) amounts to a much leſs ſum, than that which is now ſent out of the kingdom to maintain an inferior number of Heſſians. Can we think of a worthy clergyman, devoting his life to the duties of his cure, and maintaining his family for forty pound a year; and then think of our ſpending twice that ſum upon a common ſoldier? Will the fathers of our church concur in voting the ſervice of a Heſſian Boor in Germany to be equal in value to the labours of two Engliſh Curates?

If the whole number of his Majeſty's ſubjects in Britain, Ireland, and the plantations be reckoned at eleven millions, ten millions at leaſt of theſe conſiſt of people, who have not forty pound a year to ſpend upon themſelves. Yet ſo highly do we rate the ſervice of our German mercenaries, as to ſet the meaneſt of them upon the rank of our lower

gentry.

gentry. Wherein had the whole poor of Britain offended, or what had an Engliſh day-labourer done againſt the late parliament, that when he by the ſweat of his brow can earn but a ſhilling a day, he ſhould have even that ſmall pittance taxed, to maintain a foreigner of his own rank at four ſhillings and ſix-pence a day?—Will the repreſentatives of the Commons of England go on with ſo unequal a diſtribution of the public treaſure?

In the laſt war, his Britannic Majeſty purchaſed the preſervation of the Houſe of Auſtria, which was effected by the peace of Aix la Chappelle, with the blood of his ſubjects, and by means of the moſt important conqueſts of his Crown.——Theſe are not my words, but his late Majeſty's *. In the language of an admired politician, "he laviſhed his treaſure, and his troops, "and ſacrificed the intereſt of his kingdoms to "reinſtate that Princeſs in the poſſeſſion of the "inheritance of her fathers †."——Does any one doubt, but that we ſhall equally condemn ourſelves a year after the next peace, if we ſhould make the like ſacrifices to another German Prince; who probably never had it in his will; certainly never can have it in his power, to do to the Crown of Britain any the leaſt ſervice?

* See the Memorial of the Elector of Brunſwick to the Diet of the Empire, in November, 1758.

† The King of Pruſſia's Expoſition of the Motives.

Are we then to break our faith with him? No. Let us faithfully perform every thing which our treaties oblige us to, and that we may do without being ruined for him. We have, 'tis true, by ſuch a treaty as no age can produce an inſtance of, bound ourſelves not to make a peace without him, upon the ſingle condition that he will accept of our money: But there is no treaty ſubſiſting between the two crowns, which obliges us to keep a ſingle Engliſh brigade in Germany, nor to continue his ſubſidy beyond the preſent month. None, I mean, of thoſe which have been laid before parliament. But it is upon the faith of theſe only, that all grants have been made of the publick treaſure; and no miniſter, it is to be hoped, has ever been ſo great, as to avow the having firſt bound the nation by one treaty, and then deceived it by laying another before parliament.

I have caſt up all the ſums which were granted by parliament for the German ſervice, from the year 720 to 1740. I don't mean thoſe which the miniſter of that time allowed to be for the ſervice of the Electorate; for he would have been impeached, if he had avowed the ſending any thing thither; but of all thoſe grants, which his oppoſers objected againſt, as intended to ſerve an Hanoverian intereſt: I mean the grants for ſubſidies and foreign forces; and votes of confidence, to concert

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ACCOUNT

OF

GRANTS for SUBSIDIES and FOREIGN FORCES;					And of VOTES of Confidence to concert Measures with FOREIGN POWERS.			
1721	-	-	-	-	1721	72,000	0	0
1726	75,000	0	0	-	1726	125,000	0	0
1727	270,000	0	0	—	1727	250,000	0	0
1728	305,923	11	8	—	1728	60,000	0	0
1729	316,259	1	3	—	——			
1730	266,259	1	3	—	——			
1731	247,509	1	3	—	——			
1732	22,694	7	6	—	——			
1734	39,937	10	0	—	1734	31,237	10	0
1735	56,250	0	0	—	1735	10,393	5	11
1736	56,250	0	0	—	——			
1737	42,187	10	0	—	——			
1739	70,583	6	8	—	1739	476,340	17	0
L.	1,768,853	9	7			1,024,971	12	11
						1,768,853	9	7
					Total L.	2,793,825	2	6

[To face Page 45.]

meaſures with foreign powers: all theſe added together amount in the courſe of twenty years to 2,793,825 l. 2 s. 6 d. Theſe were the mighty ſums, which let out ſuch torrents of eloquence; and employed the whole force and vigour of that numerous patriotic band, who have ennobled themſelves by their oppoſition. I have not a word to offer in defence of giving a ſingle ſhilling for German purpoſes. But light lie our cenſures upon his aſhes, who, by ſuch ſmaller ſacrifices of about a hundred thouſand pound a year, could ſooth the natural prejudices of our German Kings for their native country, and keep the kingdom in peace. Well have theſe patriots lived to embalm his memory, who can now readily concur, and vote at leaſt, if not write, for our ſpending upon a German ſervice twice the ſum in one year, which he ſpent in the whole courſe of twenty. The thoughtleſs multitude have a ready reply to make to this: *That was a time of peace; this is a time of war.* But they themſelves are too wary diſputants, to aſſign that as an excuſe, which makes the principal aggravation of our misfortune. They will not ſay, that our being engaged in a war of our own, which coſts us ſix millions a year, can be a reaſon why we ſhould run into another war, which is not our own; or can the better enable us to ſpend ſix, ſeven, and eight millions more upon a German one.

I mean

I mean not to offend, and therefore doubt not the being forgiven: But in the debates of the year 1732, upon the dangers of a ſtanding army (which then conſiſted of but ſeventeen thouſand men, whereas our preſent Engliſh army amounts to one hundred and ſeventeen thouſand men,) I meet with the following paſſage, which I ſhall be excuſed the quoting, as I intend it only to point out the extreme lengths which we are going: Mr. P——y very truly added, "That the reaſon why a Britiſh army "coſts the publick more than a foreign one, was "the greater proportion of officers. *And that ſixty "thouſand men might be maintained in Germany for "the ſame money that maintained eighteen thou-"ſand in Great Britain:* and that he had been in-"formed that the twelve thouſand Heſſians in the "government's pay were maintained for much leſs "than they coſt the nation yearly."* How would the great men then on the ſtage have looked upon each other, could it then have been known that we ſhould live to ſee the time, when the *converſe* of this propoſition would become true; and that we ſhould actually vote as much money to maintain eighteen thouſand Heſſians in Germany, as ſixty thouſand Engliſhmen coſt us in Great Britain: yet this is the ſtate of our preſent Britiſh and Heſſian eſtabliſhment. †

* Rapin's Contin.

		l.	s.	d.
† 1759, Nov. 27. For 57,294				
	Engliſh troops - - - -	1,383,748	0	0
16,000	Heſſians coſt (page 28) beſide the one year's pay. -	1,310,573	0	0

What

What did we not hear from the next ſett of patriots, of Hanover councils, a Hanover ſteerage, and a Hanover rudder. Yet we have now literally freighted a veſſel with Britiſh gold, and ſent ſhip, freight, rudder and all to Hanover. The ſound of millions is grown familiar to us, and they who regard not accounts, may perhaps weigh our expences in the lump. I ſpeak not upon gueſs, but on ſtrict arithmetic. The beſt built ſhip of five hundred tons will not carry the weight of pure gold, which this whole war has coſt us. Happily for us the national veſſel, beyond all expectation, has proved to be of a greater burden: but with ſo rich a cargo on float, who does not tremble for the voyage? Or who of us for the ſake of any perſonal or family intereſt, can think ſo deſperately, as to go on to try how many more tons are wanting to ſink it?

That whole ſyſtem of Europe, by which all the other ſtates of it were united in guarding againſt the powers of France; thoſe grand alliances by which Britain gained ſo many *real* victories on the continent, and to which, as I ſhall preſently obſerve, it once entirely owed its ſecurity, are now no longer to be hoped for. I have in the Conſiderations hitherto reaſoned upon the ſuppoſition of there being ſtill ſubſiſting ſuch a thing as a balance of power in Europe, and a common intereſt to preſerve it: becauſe every argument for our concerning ourſelves with the wars of the continent muſt imply this.

So

So long as this concern for the balance of power in Europe was ſubſiſting in the minds of the chief ſtates of it, it was certainly the intereſt of Britain to keep up that additional foreign guard againſt our moſt dangerous rival; but now the ſeveral powers of the continent, and all the German courts are ſo totally disjointed, and we have been ſo long making ourſelves parties in their ſeparate quarrels, that there is not the leaſt hope of ſeeing any general union of Europe againſt the French: nay, we have been ſo long affecting to ſhew our riches and influence, and have by turns made every power in Europe ſo much our enemies, that they ſeem to be as jealous of us, as of France; and inſtead of our holding the balance of power between them and France, they are now watching for it between France and us. Tho' therefore that old principle that Britain had nothing to do with the continent, was certainly wrong, while the ſtates of it were really united with us and with each other; yet now that all the powers of the continent have renounced us, it is as certainly right. We can have nothing to do with them, for they will have no concern with us, except only to take our money, to do their own buſineſs with it. Now therefore Britain muſt itſelf provide for its own ſecurity. Its ſafety againſt France depends, under providence, ſingly upon its own arm.

By the diſtractions, which the French encouraged the King of Pruſſia to raiſe in the Empire du-

ring the laſt war; by our forcing the Empreſs Queen into the arms of France in this: and by deriving the French forces into Flanders, in the laſt, and thereby ſtripping our natural allies of their beſt guard there: the whole ſyſtem of Europe is now changed. The barrier itſelf, as well as the barrier treaty is now no more; Holland is become ſo expoſed to France, that the Dutch dare not aſſiſt us, if they were ever ſo well affected to us. Britain's whole ſecurity therefore againſt an invaſion now reſts upon the one ſingle defence of her fleets. The maintaining of that ſuperiority, and preventing the French marine from ever riſing again to an equality with ours, is now therefore become a matter of double the importance which it ever was of before: It concerns our very being. We have 'tis true at preſent ruin'd it: tho' with ſuch an immenſe increaſe of debt, and ſuch a mortgage upon our induſtry, as muſt be a heavy burden on our trade after the peace, and long diſable us for any future war. Alarming conſiderations to every thoughtful man! However, the enemies navy is now happily broken. But can any man ſay, if we ſhould be forced to give up our conqueſts, and leave their fiſhery and ſugar Trade intire, to what height an able miniſtry, and a ten years peace, may raiſe it. Men may be as ſanguine as they pleaſe, and think, after we have beaten our enemies once, that we muſt always do ſo. It may be of uſe to abate our confidence, to recollect that in Charles the IId's time,

the French had only one ſhip in our ſeas to join to the Dutch fleet: that was the whole naval force which they then had in Breſt. They afterwards brought round from the Mediterranean fifteen ſmall ſhips under the Duke of Beaufort, which did nothing. Yet ſoon after the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle Lewis the XIVth raiſed a fleet of ſixty line of battle ſhips; and in the year 1690, the French marine was grown to ſuch a heighth, as to beat the united fleets of England and Holland off Beachy-Head; and for a great part of the ſummer their fleet remained ſole maſters of the channel, and actually lay hovering over us, with all our coaſt expoſed to them. Then Britain owed its ſecurity only to its alliances on the continent. The French troops were engaged on their diſtant frontiers againſt the united force of Germany, Spain, and Savoy, (who made this diverſion at their own expence and not at ours:) and the battle of Flerus had ſo broken their army in Flanders, that they could not draw off their troops and form an army to invade us. But this is a means of deliverance which we muſt never hope for again: Surely therefore it imports us now to look to our own ſecurity, rather than that of diſtant countries which we have no concern with. The two nations are now brought to ſuch a ſtate, that a great ſuperiority in our naval force is neceſſary to our very being: Providence has put it in our power for ever to ſecure that ſuperiority, and nothing but the moſt fatal attachment to Germany can prevent it.

By

By the treaty of Cloſter-Seven the firſt German war was brought to an end. England was abſolutely releaſed from all concern with it by the expreſs act of all the ſeveral parties. Now therefore we are engaged in two wars, which are totally diſtinct from each other: a Britiſh war, and a German: a war of neceſſity, and a war of choice: a war of acquiſition, and a war of pence. The very laudable prejudices of the late reign, the intereſted views of courtiers, and the overbearing influence of particular planters, have jointly conſpired to make us confound theſe two wars with each other: and the want of diſtinguiſhing them has betrayed us into an expence of forty millions, to ruin Germany, and to ſerve no one good Britiſh purpoſe, nor indeed to ſerve the intereſt of any one court in Germany, except that of Berlin. Now that the French marine is deſtroyed, there is not any the leaſt connection between our Britiſh war and our German one. They are as ſeparable from each other as any two wars which England can be engaged in. As diſtinct as a Spaniſh war and a Swediſh. Make but this diſtinction, and the national intereſt will immediately point out what ought to be done. Party men on each ſide chooſe to confound theſe two together, each that they may find a pretence to condemn the conduct of their adverſaries, and to juſtify their own.

We muſt have a peace, ſays the one party among us; the expence of the war will ruin us. We

have money enough, ſays another party; people are as ready to lend, as the government is to borrow; don't let us make an ignominious peace. Both of theſe ſpeak truth of one war, and falſely of the other. Neither regard their country only, or they would make the neceſſary diſtinction. Do they, who ſay we muſt have a peace, really wiſh to ſave the nation from the ruinous expence it is now at? Why then do they not do it? Inſtead of looking to our enemies for a peace, let us make it for ourſelves. *Quid opus eſt votis? fac te ipſe felicem.* Inſtead of wiſhing for a peace, let us call home our troops, and there is a peace. Let us only ſtop the voluntary free gifts which we are every year making to our allies, over and above what they can pretend the leaſt right of treaty to, and from that moment the German war ceaſes, and there is a peace. The war of acquiſition, if our enemies will not treat with us, may go on, if we chooſe it; but the war of expence will be at an end. Britiſh blood will be no longer ſhed, and Britiſh treaſure will then be ſpent only upon Britiſh ſubjects. Not thrown away in Germany merely to prevent our conquering too faſt, and to keep us bleeding there, till our ſpirits are lower'd enough, to make us accept of any peace which our enemies will grant us.

On the other hand, do thoſe men, who clamour againſt making a bad peace, really mean that we ſhould make a good one? Why then do they not

addreſs

addreſs to put an end to the war of expence, which they know muſt at laſt force us into a bad one? Or why do they not purſue our war of acquiſition only, which every one ſees muſt be the direct means of forcing our enemies to grant us a good one?

In ſhort, if Britain be a free and independent ſovereignty, Providence has now put it in our power to ſupport our own war as long as we pleaſe; and bring our enemies to what terms we pleaſe, which I hope will always be moderate ones. If, on the other hand, this country is made only for the defence of another, which it cannot protect, we muſt then ſtruggle on a little longer, till our money or our patience ſhall be more entirely exhauſted; but the terms of peace will be of the French preſcribing, and not ours; and our enemies will, after that, ever hold us in thraldom, with the fear of evils, which they know we muſt not ſuffer, and cannot prevent.

To tell us that this is to be the laſt year of the war, and attempt to comfort us with the notion that our enemies are bankrupt, and come to ruin, is only taking advantage of our ignorance, and deceiving us to our own.

For three winters following, we have been told the ſame thing. *France*, it was ſaid, the next ſeſſions after the battle of Minden, *is ſinking, ſhe knows*

knows herſelf ſinking; this is the laſt effort of a dying power, the convulſion of death. Yet we have found her every ſummer in Germany to be in ſtronger vigour than ourſelves. Perhaps it may be ſaid, that the next campaign will certainly be the laſt. And, if ſo; it may be worth all the reſt: and it is pity to loſe a ſheep for a penny-worth of tar. Eloquence indeed will not expreſs himſelf in ſuch uncourtly terms: but ſuppoſe that, *hereafter*, inſtead of homely proverb, we ſhould hear the ſame ſentiment dreſſed out in bold poetical phraſes, beautiful alluſions, full flowering metaphors, and metonymies budding out of *them:* would that make the ſentiment at all the more true? All theſe flowers of rhetoric may form a very elegant noſegay for Engliſh ladies to ſmell to:—but Frenchmen won't die of them. Nor would the war be at all the nearer being brought to a happy iſſue, for our ſtateſmen amuſing themſelves with the bundling of tropes and ſimiles.

In vain, alas, do we hope to humble our enemies in Germany, a country in which they have nothing to loſe, and which we are utterly unable to defend. Five times have we eſſayed to roll this mighty ſtone up the hill, in order to turn it over the ſummit, upon the heads of our enemies on the other ſide: and, could we have fifty times tried it, we ſhould ſtill have found the attempt to be beyond

our

our ſtrength, and ſeen it come rolling back again on our own. With evil omen, therefore, ſhall the claſſics be called in aid to our politics. Virgil and Horace, however often turned to, will not befriend us. Old Homer, and all his mythology turns againſt us. The Fates have decreed this Syſippean labour to be in vain; and Virtue itſelf, however urging, cannot prevail againſt the Fates. Long before the pinch of the hill, the ſtone has always fallen back again; yet our inexorable taſk-maſter, with more than Rhadamanthean ſeverity, is ſtill ready, even ſingly, to condemn us to exert the force of all our millions to heave it up again.

It is curious to obſerve how hot and cold may be blown by the ſame breath. Can any man ſeriouſly think, that we are in the laſt moments at the end of a French war, and the next in the eve of a Spaniſh. If the Spaniards are diſpos'd to begin with us; muſt they not be well aſſured that the French are not going to end with us?— Yet,

The nation is now threatened with a Spaniſh war. God forbid that we ſhould court it; but if we are at liberty to purſue only the Britiſh intereſt, we can have no reaſon to fear it. Were the French marine in its full

full vigour, ſuch as it was in the beginning of the laſt war, and of this, and ſuch as it will be againſt the next war, if we now neglect the proper means to ſecure ourſelves; the addition of the Spaniſh marine to it, would in that caſe be a juſt ground of concern: but can thoſe men really fear a Spaniſh war; in which, now that the marine of Spain muſt be unſupported by that of France, we can have nothing to fear, and muſt have every thing to hope for; and yet wantonly run the nation into an expence of ten millions for a German quarrel, in which we have not the leaſt concern, and from which not the leaſt good can reſult to Britain? Can men be really afraid of meeting a weaker power than ourſelves at ſea; and yet go to Germany to ſeek out a power at land, which is in itſelf ſtronger than we, and is ſupported by all the other powers of Europe beſide?

On the other hand, can any man, who thinks a Spaniſh war unavoidable, ſtill adviſe the charging ourſelves with new expences, even in thoſe parts of a German war which are avoidable, and which indiſputably we may with good faith refuſe.

But ſay others: Though it may have been wrong at firſt to have entered into ſuch engagements, yet it is one thing to begin, and another to go on. Not,

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unleſs the nation be bound by any treaty to continue in that wrong courſe; otherwiſe that which was wrong done the firſt time, cannot become right by being done a ſecond time. So far as the public ſtands bound by any expreſs covenant, ſo far (if it be not ruinous; or beyond our ſtrength) we muſt go on: but in every other caſe, it has always been thought a mark of wiſdom to recover a falſe ſtep, rather than to repeat it. Apply this to a preſent inſtance, which muſt probably come this year before Parliament. By the ſeparate article of the treaty with the Landgrave, of the 1ſt April, 1760, as the account is liquidated by the protocol of 1761, we have paid to the Landgrave an hundred and twenty thouſand pounds down, and have engaged to pay him fifty thouſand more for the two ſucceeding years. But ſhould the Landgrave come another year with a ſecond demand, and refuſe to let his troops march without another two hundred and twenty thouſand pound, does any treaty oblige us to do ſo wrong a thing a ſecond time? The firſt treaty may have been made through inadvertence; but he who knows it to have been wrong, and yet makes a ſecond, is ſelf-condemned. Should the true reaſon be: ſuch an one has bade two hundred and twenty thouſand, therefore I muſt bid as much; that is the nation's misfortune. But no man's underſtanding will therefore ſay that wrong repeated becomes right. Two negatives here don't make an affirmative, but *vehementius negant*. If wrong done once, is wrong;

wrong done twice, is twice as wrong. No man can ſay, let me reap the benefit of doing wrong, and let others bear the blame of it, for having done ſo before. Nor can any one really think, that becauſe we have once given to a German Prince more than he deſerved, we are therefore bound to repeat it, and give him more and more of the public money, as often as he is pleaſed to want it. Not to add that it is ridiculous to talk of the faith of treaties, with a Prince, whoſe troops are eight or nine thouſand men deficient.

But we are now got into the war, and how can we get out? They who aſk this queſtion would have us think that they reckon it a bad thing, and that they really wiſh to get out of it. If ſo, the anſwer is eaſy. By not getting farther into it. There is no need of violating any treaty; let us faithfully adhere to all our engagements; but let us not make freſh ones, and that alone will finiſh the war. Laſt year it was ſaid, that the beſt thing in the Pruſſian treaty was its being but for a year. Why then ſhould we renew it again? Whatever may be ſaid about our making peace, this nation cannot be bound to give the King of Pruſſia four millions of crowns, as long as he ſhall be pleaſed to make war.

The annual treaty of 1758 expires in the preſent month, and cannot be renewed without the conſent of parliament. Let any man read it, and then ſay, whether it be ſuch an one; as that it can be ſuitable

to

to the dignity of the Britiſh crown to renew it. I have printed the whole of it at the end of the Conſiderations. The preamble pretends to ſay nothing more, than that we want to give him money, and we want a treaty merely to make him take it. If the ſecond article does not give us a right to demand for the defence of the Electorate the troops raiſed with our money, 'tis the moſt humiliating treaty to be found in the Britiſh annals. If we muſt deliver up our money, could we not have given it him without a treaty? and ſuch a treaty too as is even more mortifying in the terms of it than in the expence of it: 'tis a treaty which obliges him to nothing. In the modern ſtile, it has no reciprocality in it. We put it in his power to keep us at war for ever; and debar ourſelves the liberty without his conſent of making peace with France, which he is not at war with, and therefore may be at peace with when he pleaſes. The only thing he promiſes is to purſue his own quarrel, and not to make peace with the houſes of Mecklenburgh, Saxony and Auſtria, which, of all others, it is moſt for the intereſt of England that he ſhould not be at war with.

Men who have great intereſts to ſerve, may offer many reaſons for this German war; but the true reaſon is but one: and that too would ceaſe, and become none, by a general concurrence; but while our great men are full of mutual jealouſy, and every one ſuſpicious, that what he might ſay in one

place, will be made uſe of to his diſadvantage in another, this reaſon will ſtill ſubſiſt.

Is then nothing worth the hazarding for our country? Muſt we only bewail the misfortune of our party diſputes, and again ſee a proof, that thoſe ſeaſons, when the public thinks moſt about great men, are the very times, when great men think leaſt about the public. This reaſon in the preſent times can be at firſt created only by the falſe court which ſuppoſed it, and muſt be ſtrengthned and confirmed only by the ſame means. That may prompt men to invent a variety of plauſible excuſes for continuing the German war, and putting off the evil day a year longer, but all theſe oſtenſible reaſons will prove vain before the face of truth, which every private man's underſtanding will dictate to him. Authority alone will not govern the thoughts: all men will not ſhut their eyes, becauſe one man ſays he will guide.

Sometimes the aid of commerce is called in: and we are afraid that our enemies will be all powerful upon the continent, and we ſhall loſe our trade. Not as long as we can make our goods and keep our commodities. Even our enemies will buy them of us, as long as we can ſell cheapeſt: and our friends won't take them, when they become deareſt. The French and Flemings at this time annually buy near three hundred thouſand pounds worth of our tobacco; and Dunkirk, Havre, and Cette are now by that means our moſt profitable ports. Will Hamburghers,

burghers, think we, refuſe to take Guadalupe or Martinico ſugars of us, becauſe both thoſe iſlands are not in French poſſeſſion ?

Sometimes we have been told that our religion was in danger : and we hired Brandenburghers to murder and ruin Mecklenburghers in order to ſtrengthen the Proteſtant intereſt.

At other times the German war is neceſſary as a diverſion ; and we have for four years been ſpending twenty millions to prevent the French from ſuccouring their colonies ; when half the troops and treaſure employed in this diverſion, would two or three years ago have given ſuch an irreſiſtable ſuperiority to our fleets and expeditions, as would have left our enemies no colonies to ſuccour.

Sometimes it has been doubted whether we can get our troops home if we would : if ſo, then it is at leaſt a clear thing that we ought not to ſend any more. If our own General could in the midſt of a campaign and even in the face of a victorious enemy, make good his retreat to Stadt, it will be very hard if our foreign general can't effect ſuch a march when the French are gone into winter quarters.

At other times our compaſſion is applied to : we can't leave theſe poor people to be eat up by the French ; to have their country turned into a deſert ;

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their very apparel ſold at auction for their contribution *; their houſes plundered, or pulled down for the ſoldiers firewood, and the helpleſs inhabitants expoſed to ſtarve without covering or ſhelter. Why then don't we protect them? We can't do it. Send over our whole army and the militia after them, the enemy will ſtill be ſuperior. The French may go home in winter, and let us ſpend our money there, that the country at their return may be the better worth ſqueezing, and our Gazette may tell us how Prince Ferdinand has drove them before him: but the next Summer the French army will be there again; and all that we can do is to enrage theſe poor peoples enemies ten times the more, and furniſh them with an excuſe for all their exceſſes. Let generous Britiſh hearts more *juſtly* expreſs concern for them. But what is it which this argument would ſuggeſt in their behalf? Far from offering any relief, it would have us bribe the Landgrave by a great ſum to ſell his ſubjects afreſh to ruin, and let the French come next year and commit the ſame cruelties over again.

In breaking the treaty of Cloſter Seven, Britain took a falſe ſtep, which nothing can recover, but the bringing us to it again. France has no quarrel with any of our allies; they may all make their terms with France juſt as they did before: Brunſwick, Heſſe, and the Hanoverian chancery itſelf,

* See the laſt Gazette of November 1761.

under

under the mediation of Vienna, were then treating at Verſailles. France has now no quarrel with any of them, nor can regard them as enemies any longer than while they can hope to ſee us ruin ourſelves by regarding them as friends.

At other times we have been told that Holland and the Netherlands would be in danger. This was the pretext in the laſt war, and for the ſake of a fatal diverſion, we ſent over our national troops into Flanders, againſt the will of the Dutch, to keep the war out of the Electorate, and ruin the barrier; and put our moſt natural allies into the power of France.

We may now be told, that Germany is in danger, and the French King will make himſelf Elector of Hanover, or Lord of Bremen, and gain a port upon the Weſer and the northern ocean. And is not this a reaſon againſt our giving ſix hundred and ſeventy thouſand pound to keep the houſes of Auſtria and Brandenburgh in blood, who would be the firſt to take umbrage at ſuch an attempt? and who, with Sweden and Denmark, would be the neareſt concerned, and the only powers able to prevent it?

In ſhort, it is impoſſible to ſay what may be the oſtenſible reaſons, which intereſted or indolent men may alledge, to conceal the true one. But all this is only giving to every man of common underſtand-

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ſtanding an advantage, which no ſuperiority of rank or parts can compenſate for. I have before ſhewn, that the war itſelf, in its firſt principle, is wrong; againſt the true intereſt of Europe, of Germany, and of Britain, and therefore, in the nature of things, there can no argument be brought for it, which will not be convertible into a much ſtronger againſt it.

F I N I S.